Paula Brügger

The reductionism as the basis of animal models of fallibility

Besides indefensible under ethically, Once you submit beings sencientes1 the physical and psychological suffering (Singer, 1998; Regan, 2001), the vivissecção2 is a practice that fails in at least one fundamental criterion to be considered truly scientific: predictabilidade. Before some considerations about the epistemological reasons underlying the poor results from animal models, I would refer the reader to some contexts and data that illustrate the point made earlier.

With respect to drugs, eg, despite the huge amount of dead guinea pigs supposed to ensure the effectiveness and test the side effects of new drugs, Greek & Greek (2000, p.117) out that "according to the organization Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, only 1% of new drugs tested in laboratories go to the clinical stage (when tested on human volunteers). Chegam of which the market, many have serious side effects and unforeseen risks. "A review by the American government on drugs launched between 1976 and 1985 revealed that 51,5% them offered unforeseen risks in testing " (Barnard & Kaufman, 1997, p.81). Greek & Greek (2000, p.58) emphasize that, "Every year, tens of thousands of people become ill due to the use of drugs sold legally. Archibald (2005), who argues in the same direction, further states that the side effects of prescription drugs are among the leading causes of deaths in Ocidente3. She cites the recent case of Vioxx – a drug to combat arthritis – that was withdrawn globally in September 2004, after causing 140.000 cases of heart attacks and strokes in the U.S. only. The drug, when tested in nonhuman animals, proved to be safe and even beneficial to their hearts. Another example worth mentioning is that of hormone replacement therapies. Prescribed for millions of women, because it decreased the risk of heart disease and stroke in monkeys, such therapy significantly increased the risk of these diseases in women and also caused 20.000 cases of breast cancer. Archibald cites several other drugs that matam4 and Greek & Greek (2003, p.112-115) also have a long list of drugs withdrawn from the market, in Britain and the USA, on account of its very serious side effects (including death). They point out that the drugs listed represent a small part of total calamity. The complete list is almost innumerable, they say, since too many problems were reported even.

And why such drugs are ineffective and even dangerous? Because the data from tests with nonhuman animals are chaotic and unreliable. Here is a prime example: "Researchers chose 6 drugs with known side effects in humans. Animal testing correctly predicted 22 collateral effects, but incorrectly presented 48 effects did not occur in humans. And more, animal tests did not predict 20 Side effects that occur in humans. Therefore, animal models have erred 68 times 90. So, in 76% the time, results from animal experiments were wrong " (Lumley and Walker apud Greek & Greek, 2003, p.111)

The animal model is flawed because there are differences, between us and them, the anatomy, physiology, environmental interactions, We types of food ingested, etc., that result in the absorption mismatch, distribution and metabolism of. In addition, Laboratory conditions are more controlled than in human life and the dose administered to animals can be much larger than those required to humans, in terms of body weight. Therefore, Apart from the fact that the routes of inoculation of different substances - whether oral, anal, peritoneal, vaginal, etc. – can exert a great influence on the test results, the dosage may also be a crucial factor.

Fano (2000), eg, highlights that many animal tests occur in conditions (dosages, methods, etc.) that have no similarity to real life. In an experiment involving the sweetener cyclamate, the animals received human equivalent 552 soda bottles per day. In two experiments with trichlorethylene (used as an agent in coffee descafeinizante) rats received an equivalent dose 50 million cups of coffee per day. This can distort the results of two ways: can poison the cells and tissues, so severely, enough to prevent carcinogenic response that could occur in other conditions; or you can overload, or change, metabolic processes and cause a carcinogenic response that could not occur, she concludes.

Furthermore, the metabolic rate of the animals is variable. Laboratory animals are generally smaller than the human and, it, have a much more intense metabolism. Thus, eliminating toxins quickly than humans, which can prevent the toxic effects appear, as observed Fano.

Although vivisectors claim that rats and mice constitute good models for studying diseases and other conditions or ailments that affect humans, there are significant differences between them and us. According to Greek & Greek (2003, p.121), "Rats must breathe through the nose, which can change the shape of the entrance of a substance into the bloodstream; the placenta is considerably more porous than the mice in humans; distribution due to differences in the intestinal microflora, they are much more likely to metabolize a compound administered orally in an active metabolite, or toxic; acid secretion in the stomach them is continuous, as it occurs in humans only in response to the presence of food, or other stimuli. Rats are also nocturnal animals, susceptible to different diseases of our, also have different nutritional requirements and are unable to vomit. All these peculiarities (anatomical, physiological, etc.) affect absorption, the pharmacokinetics and metabolism of compounds, or cause unexpected reactions in relation to a compound "5.

Many other issues that affect the data from tests with nonhuman animals could be added here as, eg, the influence of environmental enrichment (see New Scientist article, (173[2333], 09 of mar.2002:11, intitulado “Home comfort for lab animals create problems for researchers”). But, after all, issues that were at the heart of such chaotic results?

Animal models are inaccurate because they are immersed in a practical and mechanistic paradigm, therefore, reductionist, that became hegemonic in our culture. This paradigm is also inextricably linked to a man-centered ethical and Speciesist. The subject-object opposition, basis of the alleged objective description of nature, is another dichotomy that lies at the heart of the formal corpus of knowledge in our society and also in animal experiments. It, becomes an animal model to study, which is analyzed according to its supposed ability to predict or reproduce a phenomenon. Within the mechanistic paradigm that would make sense, treat as it would analyze, understand, or identify, after a certain mechanism to verify how that mechanism (genetic, physiological, metabolic, etc.) could be used to predict other, the body being modeled. It happens that the social and natural phenomena are much more complex than posit the assumptions of mechanistic, which makes this paradigm or inappropriate, at least not, too limited to describe this range of complexity (see Maturana, 2002; Capra, 1996; Bruges, 2004, p.63-120).

Capra (1996), eg, argues that there are three criteria for a comprehensive description of the nature of life: the pattern of organization (configuration of relationships that determine the essential characteristics of the process); structure (the physical embodiment of the pattern of organization); and the method (activity involved in incorporating continuous pattern of organization). In this view, all living systems are cognitive systems and cognition always implies the existence of an autopoietic network, in other words, the basic characteristic of a living network is that it continually produces itself, she autocria (see also Maturana, 2002). This process of self-creation also affects the ability to form new structures and new patterns of behavior.

So, although there are many common features between us and other animals, microscopic differences between our cells and these may lead to gross errors. All species – plants and animals – follow the same design: are formed by the same units DNA (A,T,C,G) which are joined in the same process. But, while the genetic material is the same, the composition, Different arrangements are. That makes all the difference.

The next context – that involves the resemblance between us and chimpanzees – clearly shows the reason rechaçarmos the reductionist argument that such animals are excellent models. According to Greek & Greek (2003, p.49-50), "If we examine the genes that encode proteins that act as enzymes, or provide the basis for structure, or cell movement, the similarity between us and chimpanzees is greater than 99%. The difference is, therefore, the building blocks not, but in how they are arranged and controlled by regulatory genes that control the pattern and growth. So, eg, a single amino acid difference in, between non-human primates and humans, HIV causes the plug not to the same cellular receptor in non-human primates ".

This is the "dialectical" nature. And that's exactly what Capra argues, in the previous paragraph (see also Brügger, 2004, p.125-128).

So, the high degree of genetic correspondence that exists between us and such models (as primates and rodents) MAKE sense only, in reliability, within a reductionist view of science. The non-human animals can not be considered as good "causal analog models" (CAMs). According to the philosophers Hugh La-brochure and Niall Shanks (1996) Analog causal model works as follows: X (model) Y is similar to (the object to be modeled) with respect to the properties {a….and}. X has the additional property f. Although not observed in Y, Y is assumed that also has the property f. Then, Z if the drug causes the death of the animal model (eg, penicillin kills guinea pigs), by analogia, kill humans (branch of the Greek & Greek, 2003, p.45). La-Follete e Shanks (1996) claim that "the causal analogical models that would also present common characteristics; connected between the causal features; and no significant disanalogias. And they say that the possibility of disanalogias relevant causal destroys the argument that animal research has direct relevance to the study of human biological phenomena. This is because, until they are done testing on humans, there is no way of knowing whether or not there between us and disanalogias relevant animal model. And there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that there disanalogias relevant causal. Human animals and non-human were subjected to very different evolutionary pressures. The fact that two species have similar biological functional properties gives us no reason to think that they have similar underlying causal mechanisms. Although humans are not "substantially" different from mice, either life forms or 'higher', are different in terms of complexity. Differences between species, even small, often result in wildly divergent responses with respect to stimulus qualitatively identical. Evolutionary differences in the biological systems of humans and rodents, eg, trigger a cascade that results in marked differences in important biomedical properties between the two species'.

Therefore, The presence of small differences at the cellular level, crease as the Theory of Evolution, invalidate extrapolations between species.

We understand very limited strength autopoietic nature, but we want to exercise dominion over it. I think the issues raised here should, therefore, be part of the debate on the effectiveness of animal models as tools for teaching and research. That's because the professionals who make use of them are, in theory, and scientists are producing knowledge, besides being forming a legion of followers of its precepts scientifically questionable.

Although today it is no longer possible to deny the influence of the factors highlighted here – concerted with each other which can produce a completely new and unexpected fact, with which the scientist has to deal – the epistemological foundations underlying such processes, still represent a question considered too abstract. However, accepting that there is an interdependence between variables that can not be isolated and studied separately, or quantified in terms of influence, part of the essence of the scientific method – the same mechanistic – to a lesser extent. This is a much deeper issue and crucial than it may seem, it implies truly understand that knowledge is always an abstraction built in the strict sense of the term. And some abstractions, or metaphors, are more suited than others to describe certain realities.

Thus, except in cases in which animal models have been rigorously validated (but this implies the death of millions of them!), the correct data, apparently obtained from animal models, are, actually the result of coincidence and chance, or clues provided by other research fields. Not reflect the result of a truly scientific endeavor, since it does not require a detailed knowledge of the complex mechanisms involved in the processes studied6. Such arrangements seem to reflect nothing more than a small percentage of successful attempts and mere, it, not differ significantly from other situations such as hit rates in basketball hoops, eg, by people who do not master this sport.

Urge, therefore, us to make a careful reflection on the maintenance of this paradigm anchored on values ​​anthropocentric and speciesist. It is not reasonable to say that it is impossible to do without animal models when there is not a systematic investment (not in education, or in research) no use of alternatives, whether substitute or alternative techniques in the broad sense (as clinical databases, epidemiological and other information sources).

Finally, is to say that the criticism of animal models are part of a greater critical respect the views of health and disease present in medicine that has become hegemonic, based intervention or prevention. Such a view is part of a paradigm that privileges solutions "pharmacological" and "techno"-logical, as indeed is the dominant perspective in our culture (emblematic example is the treatment / cure proposed for "climate change" now underway). And, again, lack of systemic approach lies at the foundation of all these issues.

Notes:

1. Sentient beings are those capable of experiencing pleasure, pain, joy and other feelings and emotions.

2. The term vivisection has the meaning of "live cut". It is employed to denote the completion of operations or studies in live animals to observe certain phenomena.

3. The former are: cancer, Heart Disease and Stroke (cerebrovascular accidents).

4. Some drugs are cited by Archibald Baycol, a Rezulin, Propulsid, Opren, Eraldin.

5. There are important differences between males and females, and between strains and results from different institutions.

6. As so-called "feedback loops" and other mechanisms that can act in a self-referential models proposed.

Bibliography:

ARCHIBALD, Kathy. Animal testing: science or fiction? The Ecologist, May. 2005: 14-17.

BARNARD, Neal & KAUFMAN, Stephen. Animal research is wasteful and misleading. Scientific American, February. 1997. 80-82.

BRÜGGER, Paula. Animal models. In: Animal Friend - Reflections on interdisciplinary education and environment: animals, ethics, diet, health, paradigms. Florianópolis: Contemporary Letters, 2004: 63-120; 125-128).

CAPRA, Fritjof. The warp of life: a new scientific understanding of living systems. Trad. Newton Roberval Eichemberg. Sao Paulo, Cultrix, c1996.

Fano, Alix. Beastly practice. The Ecologist, flight 30 (3), May, 2000: 24-28

GREEK, Ray C.& GREEK, Jean S. Sacred cows and golden geese – the human cost of experiments on animals. Foreword by Jane Goodall. New York/London: Continuum, 2000.

GREEK, Ray & GREEK, Jean. Specious Science: How Genetics and Evolution Reveal Why Medical Research on Animals Harms Humans. London, New York: Continuum, 2003.

LaFOLLETTE, Hugh & SHANKS, Niall. Brute Science: Dilemmas of Animal Experimentation. London: Routledge, 1996.

MATURANA, Humberto R.& VARELA, Francisco J.. The tree of knowledge - the biological basis of human understanding. 2Ed. Trad. Humberto Mariotti and Lia Diskin.São Paulo: Palas Athena, 2002.

REGAN, Tom. Defending animal rights. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001.

SINGER, Peter. Ethical Practice. 2Ed. Trad. Jefferson L. Camargo. Sao Paulo, Martins Fontes, 1998.

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Paula Brügger é bióloga, Professor of the Department. of Ecology and Zoology of the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC), former member of the Ethics Committee on Animal Use – (CEUA), Master in Education and PhD in Human Sciences – Society and Environment. She is author of the books “Education or training environment?”, which is the 3rd edition, and “Animal Friend - Reflections on interdisciplinary education and environment”. Currently coordinates the educational project “Amigo Animal”.
E-mail: brugger@ccb.ufsc.br